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SEAWAY: Advanced Decision Support to Expeditionary Operations 
Do you know what a parable is?  When you’re over 50 you don’t tell jokes.  You tell 
parables. Bear with me a moment for a parable. 
The shadows were lengthening in the swamp and the bunny rabbit came hopping down the 
trail and the blind snake came hopping down the trail.  And the blind bunny rabbit 
smacked into the blind snake and they recoiled, and the blind bunny said, “Who and what 
are you?” and the snake said, “I don’t know.  Who and what are you?”  And so they 
decided to find out. And slowly that snake wrapped himself around that bunny rabbit and 
he said, “You’ve got large ears to hear with and a bunny rabbit tail and rabbit whiskers and 
big hoppers.  I think you’re a bunny rabbit.”  And the blind bunny rabbit said, “Oh what 
joy! This is the greatest day of my life!  I know what I am!  Now, let’s find out what you 
are.” And very slowly that snake uncoiled and lay down on the dust of the trail and the 
bunny hopped over and reached out: “Cold skin, small beady eyes, speak with a forked 
tongue, no visible sex organs…I think you’re a lawyer!” 
In the ten years that I have been working on decision making you’re never quite certain 
what the outcome of what you start is going to be.  And the law of unintended 
consequences is very much alive and well, particularly in developing new applications for 
decision support. Today I am going to provide a quick overview of the SEAWAY decision 
support system. 
In San Luis Obispo we have seventy-seven SEAWAY systems which are being prepared 
for fielding, and we are deep into the design of the follow on version.  So, we are 
discussing a decision support system which is operational. Before we explore SEAWAY, 
we probably ought to talk about defining decision making problems and applying decision 
support. 
In the case where the senior decision maker has poor decision skills, even the best decision 
support will make only the most marginal of difference. However, good decision support 
can make a huge difference if you have just an adequate decision process and adequate 
decision-making skills at the top.  But without adequate decision-making skills supported 
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by an adequate decision process, all the decision support in the world won’t make much 
difference. 
My second observation on the design of decision support systems is that we have to be 
careful not ask the computer to do something which it doesn’t do well.  Not because it’s 
unfair to the computer, that’s nonsense – but because it will undercut our own mission and 
deceive us. 
Computers don’t conceptualize. Point one.  They don’t have intuition.  Point two. And, 
three, they do not do well in analyzing subtlety on the modern battlefield in 
terms…especially in terms of urban operations and political considerations. With this in 
mind, we need to be careful when we talk about decision makers not forget to use this very 
elaborate massively parallel processor we’ve got up here on the top of our neck to assess 
the subtlety of the battlefield and the campaign. 
Now, when conducting seminars at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, I 
compare the battlefield that existed prior to Afghanistan with the battlefield that exists 
today. Consider just a few of the contrasts with which we are now faced – but which are 
not reflected in our decision support tools most of which were developed in the Cold War 
period. The gross battlefield of the north German plain, large forces, no ROE, very, very 
large movements, few or no rules. A battlefield where precision was not critically 
important, and one that rewarded mass, depth, and size.  The characteristics of this cold 
war framework defined United States military decision support initiatives and, to a very 
large extent, continue to do so today.  However, we have a problem; this defining 
battlefield has disappeared to be replaced by one which is quite different. 
Although the “E” word is not fashionable, we are closer to dealing with a situation as a 
military which is more akin to the British situation between 1814 and 1914 than we are to 
any other period I can think of.  So if that’s the case, if we’re dealing with subtle 
battlefields with political and military mixtures in places like Afghanistan and Iraq and 
elsewhere, then we also need to remember that the individual decision-making skills from 
private to general are probably as important as decision support and deserve at least as 
much attention. 
Second point:  Military decision support systems are designed for experienced 
professionals – not amateurs.  Decision support systems are not designed to raise the 
incompetent and inexperienced to an adequate level. The systems are designed to be 
leveraged by experienced professionals who understand both the limitations and the 
strengths which the computer offers.  The poorly trained and the inexperienced will 
substitute slavish dependence for calculated evaluation of results. 
Third point: There’s a moral dimension to the relationship between a decision support tool 
and the decision maker.  Depending on where you come from, you will agree or violently 
disagree with my next couple of comments. However, in my view, we must never place the 
computer between the decision maker and the responsibility to make a decision – 
70 
especially one involving a decision on life and death.  Never. When we do that what have 
we done?  There is no longer a linkage between the person and the action he or she has 
directed. There’s no linkage between the decision to take violent action and the 
consequences. If the computer is between me and that decision, then all I did was exercise 
the computer.  At any rate, I think what I have expressed is largely a Marine Corp point of 
view, but it’s one that I believe is well worth thinking about. 
For the last three years I’ve been working with about thirty Navy and Marine officers 
designing and building SEAWAY, a decision support tool for the MAGTF, the Joint Task 
Force, and for expeditionary warfare in general. 
SEAWAY’s design combines human strengths with computer strengths in a collaborative 
framework. On the human side the system design assumes that conceptualization will 
come from the user.  It is in the design of the system architecturally.  Secondly, the design 
assumes that the generation of a conceptual scheme of maneuver and its description will 
come from a human because this sort of conceptualization is a uniquely human skill.  The 
design assumes that the computer will provide the ability to track hundreds of thousands of 
items. It assumes that the computer will stand back-to -back watches without getting tired, 
and that the computer will rapidly convert our conceptual schemes of what the force is 
going to do into the logistics and the delivery of “how” it’s going to do it.  So, 
architecturally, the design “leads to strength.”  When you build a decision support tool 
“you must “lead to strength” and combine the human strengths with those from the 
computer. Don’t ask the computer to do what it can’t do (such as conceptualize) any more 
than ask us to track thousands of items individually. 
SEAWAY provides tools to support the Joint Task Force and MAGTF at the operational 
level of war. Why the Joint Task Force and why the operational level?  Because we have 
turned “TPFDDing” into a cottage industry.  Because we have spent the last 15 years 
building strategic tools which we’ve rarely used. Because we have focused on the strategic 
level of war rather than the operational because it is easier to deal with. Because we have 
done very little to help the force where war is actually waged --  at the operational level. 
Because there are no tools for the Joint Task Force commander. Because he has no 
capability to analyze theater logistic posture and compare it to the support needed for his 
intended campaign.  Because he has no capability to translate his intentions into what it 
may take to support them.  None of the tools needed to support these functions exist.  And, 
even as we discuss the absence of these needed tools we are standing up permanent joint 
task force headquarters. Amazing, isn’t it? Well, that’s why we built SEAWAY. 
With these thoughts in mind, I went to ONR about three years ago with a vision and said, 
“Look, we’re talking about supporting widely dispersed operations at deep inland locations 
whether the focus is Army deep maneuver or Marine operational maneuver form the sea, 
or similar joint concepts. We’re proposing inserting forces and supporting them at great 
distances inland in joint and coalition operations.  That means that the forces will be 
supported at the end of a helicopter-borne umbilical.  That means that as fast change occurs 
(and the only certainty on the battlefield is continual change) we’re going to be forced to 






division’s march to Baghdad.  Think about how often unanticipated even by the wildest of 
planners that constantly changing operational requirement had to be altered. 
As I said, the only certainty on a battlefield is change.  You can be certain everything’s 
going to change and that the plan is going to be great until the first shot is fired and not a 
second farther.  After that it’s a new plan.  So, the underlying assumption in we built into 
SEAWAY is that everything will change all the time.  This new decision support tool 
would be built to provide recommendations in the face of continuous change. 
So, we can establish several characteristics, which SEAWAY had to have. First, lead to 
strengths, human and computer.  Second, provide assistance in a familiar fashion (Don’t 
give staffs a tool that has a whole new face on it). Third, provide flexible tools. Why? 
Because we don’t know what the force is going be faced with.  We don’t know the kind of 
campaigns. Nobody would have predicted Afghanistan or Iraq in 1998.  They might have 
predicted other things, but those two wouldn’t have been at the top of the list. So tools 
which can adapt to any situation… because we can’t predict what the operating forces will 
face. Fourth, compliment the established planning process.  Provide tools which 
compliment what our forces already understand and exercise. Fifth, make the tools 
collaborative. In December 2001 five staffs employed SEAWAY at separate locations 
simultaneously for three days. All at the same system at the same time from four or five 
different locations. Sixth, make it fast and accurate.  Identifying change isn’t the battlefield 
objective – the objective is spotting its implications and exploiting it before the other guy 
can. Finally, seventh, make it useful. Not only do the JTF’s not have any tools, but many 
of the tools we’ve given them are either so difficult to use or so trivial that they don’t use 
them. Decision support should deal with very difficult issues in complex decision 
situations in a fashion familiar to the user. 
Constant change.  I mentioned that the underlying assumption in SEAWAY’s design was 
dealing with continuous battlefield and theater change. What sort of change?  The 
resources available to the Joint Force Commander change continuously as consumption 
and re-supply exercise their opposite effects. The battlefield itself continuously changes, 
whether it’s a battlefield like Iraq, or whether it’s something far less well-defined such as 
Afghanistan, or a combination of both.  The friendly, enemy, and neutral elements are all 
dynamic. As a result of these factors and others, plans must change all the time. As a 
result, the JTF commander is faced with three continuously changing cycles all of which 
interact. SEAWAY is designed to deal with these continuously changing cycles, to accept 
constant changes, and to provide alerts, warnings, recommendations, and plans – and to 
change these as change demands. 
What tools does a JFC have to deal with change? Damn few.  While I was a Chief of Staff 
in the Pacific, we formed five real JTFs -- and each time it was a pick-up ballgame. Each 
time we contributed the tools we thought could help but they were pretty poor.  So, 
SEAWAY was and is a product of frustration as well as a product of commitment and 
need. It must support single service, joint, and coalition operations equally and easily.  As 
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 I think you’ll see during the demonstration, it can do so.  And it should do so rapidly 
—whether generating options or assessing their supportability. 
The tools in SEAWAY were also designed to assist professionals in identifying 
opportunity costs and assessing risks. The important word there is “help” – not do it for 
them. I’m probably telling some in this audience how to suck eggs, but I find that there’s a 
widespread misunderstanding as to the difference between  “opportunity cost” and “risk”. 
It really is important to understand the distinction.  Opportunity cost is an action foregone 
as a result of your decision to execute a particular course of action.  In other words, it’s 
something you can no longer do.  It is the cost of selecting that course of action. For 
instance, if I decide I’m going to shoot up 85% of all of my artillery ammunition tonight, 
then tomorrow morning one of the opportunity costs of that decision is an inability to 
provide artillery fires until I can get re-supplied. That’s an opportunity cost. 
It’s not a risk. Risk is the likelihood that something will happen times the consequences if 
it does happen.  Using the artillery y example, if we are engaged in a United Nations 
support operation, firing up all the artillery rounds may have very little consequence, and 
hence the risk is slight.  However, if we were engaged in North Korea, it would be an 
entirely different and far more serious risk situation.  So, a good decision support tool at 
the Joint Task Force level should help us identify opportunity costs and certainly should 
assist in assessing the associated risk.  Philosophically, I would never build a system that 
assesses risk.  I would build one that provides indices and allows professionals to assume 
that responsibility. I continue to believe that the responsibility for risk assessment must 
remain squarely on the shoulders of the commander and his staff. 
The graphic below presents the basic logic flow of Seaway.  Many of you are thinking, “ 
I’ve seen that before.” and you bet you have.  It’s the logic of the military planning 
process. First, A commander generates a notion. Then, using IPB and LPB tools in 
SEAWAY we can quickly generate a scheme of maneuver on an interactive battlefield. 
Interactive? What does that mean?  It means that as I draw the rivers in, the agents 
understand that they are rivers.  If I try to draw a scheme of maneuver across that river for 
a tank unit they will alert. They will look at that unit and tell me “Sorry, tanks don’t swim. 
You need to find a bridge or go somewhere else.”  In other words, they understand what’s 
on that map.  They understand what’s in the unit.  They understand the terrain and the 
weather. If we create a swamp and we try to go through it, they’re going to adjust the rate 
of advance and all kinds of other things in the logistics. 
So, returning to the logic flow, we generate a scheme of maneuver. First we task organize 
the force to be employed. SEAWAY can employ units as task forces, as individual units, 
or as combinations of task forces and units. It is adaptive because we have to be adaptive 
as we fight. It is doctrinally neutral, allowing the user to employ the force according to any 
doctrine that is appropriate.  Just as we can create allied and friendly task forces, 
SEAWAY supports creating enemy task forces and then employing these. Although this 






friendly forces can be accomplished with enemy forces, neutral forces, and allied forces. 
You can task organize all four, you can employ all four, and you can assess supportability, 
opportunity costs, and risks for all.  Now, at this point I don’t know where this capability is 
going to lead because we really haven’t been able to test it yet. However, there’s some real 
excitement about it building in the intelligence community about it. 
Once we have generated a scheme of maneuver on SEAWAY’s interactive battlefield, we 
can pose key questions aimed at assessing supportability, opportunity costs, and risk. 
Question one: is it supportable in terms of inventory? Question two: can I deliver it to with 
the transport assets I have? And, question three?  At what price (in both cases)?  The 
question of price focuses on opportunity costs and risks. For example, the “price” of 
delivery can be measured in lost operational flexibility for the joint task force.  Because 
we’re operating at a deep inland location, all logistics must be delivered by helicopter. 
However, maneuver also depends on helicopters – the same helicopters. That’s the built in 
tension in emerging doctrine, especially that supporting sea basing.  A tool such as 
SEAWAY must assist in rapidly furnishing decision support to commanders and staffs in 
answering the question of “At what price?” 
A good operational planning team at I MEF can generate a scheme of maneuver in 
SEAWAY in about 10 or 15 minutes for a MEB of 12-15,000 troops.  Once that scheme is 
complete, the OPT will give SEAWAY guidance on expected intensity, phases in the 
scheme, and other key guidance. SEAWAY will then rapidly perform several functions. 
First, agents will translate the operational scheme of maneuver into a logistic statement of 
requirements in about ten minutes. That statement is a recommendation of what must be 
delivered in what quantity to what landing zones for which units in what time frame in 
order to support the phased scheme of maneuver generated by the OPT. 
Next, we arrive at our first major decision point.  Do we have the fuel, water, food, and 
ammunition inventory to do it?  Because SEAWAY is fully interoperable with ICODES 
(and hopefully with TCAIMSII when that system is proved), agents can compare what is 
required to execute the scheme of maneuver phase-by-phase with what is currently 
available and what is en route to the theater. The result is to identify the deficits, where 
stocks are located that could offset them, and when new stocks of the short items are die to 
arrive. So, as a Joint Task Force commander, at any point in time, I can see what is coming 
and what is here, and how well it supports my proposed course of action.  Now, with 
agents translating operational courses of action directly into logistic requirements and 
comparing these with available supplies, we have given the JFC a valuable tool with which 
to shape the theater out perhaps thirty days. 
In this process we would probably receive alerts with messages such as the fact that we 
don’t have enough 155 to execute at the intensities we have specified. Well maybe we do 
and maybe we don’t.  You and I may know very well that we do, and that the deficit is in 
fact very minor. However, the agents are making recommendations based on a set of rules. 




Let me talk for a moment about decision support systems and the importance of 
transparency. My advice is simple: If you can’t open the hood and look at the basis for 
every computation and how the agents are functioning, don’t buy it and don’t use it. It’s 
that simple.  I think the rule is ironclad.  Don’t buy it and don’t use it if you can’t open it 
up and can’t look at it.  Every computational basis in Seaway is transparent to the user. 
That’s the good news.   The bad news is you’d better protect access to these important 
files. 
Once the commander has determined that the scheme of maneuver is supportable in terms 
of inventory, the question becomes “Can I get it there, and at what price in terms of 
operational flexibility?” First, we identify the assets which are available to deliver supplies 
and equipment. There are tools which support reserving helicopters and other delivery craft 
down for maintenance, to be used in assaults and other tactical operations, and various 
other categories used by the operating forces.  SEAWAY will then load every remaining 
helicopter (and LCAC if these can be employed) individually by tail number, using the 
performance characteristics for that particular craft.  The agents in SEAWAY will then 
create a detailed sortie-level phased delivery plan that exactly corresponds to the demands 
and the timing of the parent scheme of maneuver. 
Why go to such lengths? Because SEAWAY was designed for war fighting assessment and 
this sort of accuracy and realism is way beyond “tonnage divided by numbers of aircraft”. 
If I have 12 helicopters on the deck of a LHA how many of them do you think will have 
the same characteristics?  Perhaps three?  The other nine will have all different lift 
characteristics, and these might vary by as much as 40%. It gets better than that.  What’s 
the difference between a helicopter lifting off and LHD seaward of Wonsan in February 
and lifting off and LHD seaward of Wonsan in July?  It may be as much as a 40% variation 
in payload. Heat and humidity take their toll on helicopters.  So, to summarize this step, 
Seaway allows you to characterize and to set performance characteristics for every 
helicopter individually as you build the delivery plan.  Agents then load each bird 
individually and build a sortie level plan involving multiple ships, multiple tactical bases 
ashore, and multiple forward landing zones. It is complex, and it ought to be for that is the 
nature of warfighting. 
SEAWAY may take as long as twenty or twenty five minutes to generate all of the sorties 
and decision aids describing a delivery plan of 100 sorties or more..  We may also receive 
agent alerts indicating that the supplies and equipment needed for the scheme of maneuver 
can’t be delivered in the time element which we have prescribed. In this case the agents 
offer us several different options designed to bring the plan into an acceptable state.  We 
can move the sea base; we can level supplies between landing zones; we can increase 
transportation assets; and, if we still can’t deliver the needed supplies in the timeframe 
required, then the course of action is unsupportable in terms of delivery.  But, for the first 
time, because SEAWAY is distributed and collaborative, we all know it’s not supportable, 
whether the JFC at sea, the GCE commander ashore, or the J3 over there on the top of a 
mountain. And, we can all see why it's unsupportable without staff meetings and endless 
briefings. We can all see the same explanatory screen at the same time. 
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What does this do to tempo? It can dramatically speed it up. What does it do to adaptation 
if I can now do three or four schemes of maneuver in a morning that previously took three 
days? What does it do to accuracy if we’ve got agents tracking hundreds of thousands of 
items and rapidly calculating the support for each phase in a scheme of maneuver? N75 
used Seaway two weeks ago in an analysis of future LHA-R requirements.  Some of the 
MEB delivery plans were 180 sorties long and involved several hundred thousand items 
for delivery. 
Now. Let me pause for a minute and address how SEAWAY creates and then employs 
ships to build a sea base. Because ICODES is fully interoperable, agents in SEAWAY can 
digitally create any US ship including all service pre-positioning vessels, all L-class ships, 
and all black bottoms owned or leased by TRANSCOM.   Additionally, for the almost 300 
ships in the current system inventory, SEAWAY knows the deck cyclic rates. It knows the 
helicopter spots.  It knows the L-CAC wells, and it knows many other characteristics, all of 
which may be adjusted by the user. You can increase the helicopter spots.  You can 
increase the wet wells if you want to do all that.  But the defaults are the clear values of the 
ships as these exist today. 
SEAWAY is not designed as a current battle management tool.  We’re building a planning 
and assessment tool.  So don’t mix up battle management or war-gaming a current battle 
situation with planning and assessment. Battle management is “right now”, and is 
essentially reactive. SEAWAY is really a set of tools designed to support the staff in 
performing future operations and future plans – operations to be conducted two to 30 days 
out. It’s tools could also be used to validate and assess the extent to which an existing 
theater war plan could actually support a prescribed force under a specified set of 
operational conditions using the logistics which have been planned. There are undoubtedly 
many many more uses, 
A question always arises on how the agents calculate the logistics for each phase in a 
proposed scheme of maneuver. What do the agents know as that is occurring? They know 
the distances and the forms of maneuver which have been prescribed (some are more 
consumptive than others). They know every vehicle in a unit or task force and what it 
consumes. They know every vehicle in a unit or task force that shoots, and what it shoots 
at each specified intensity.  And because we gave it guidance on the scheme of maneuver, 
they know the expected intensities.  The agents are observing and calculating constantly as 
we task organize, select objectives and forms of maneuver, receive weather conditions and 
their impacts, and provide commander's guidance.  Logistics is now part of the course of 
action generation process rather than an inaccurate and much delayed postscript. 
There are many capabilities that have been asked for in the next SEAWAY, Version 3.0. It 
will include the capability to generate all supporting plans for the STOM assault and a 
great many other things, including support not just to rotary wing aviation but also to fixed 
wing aviation. Other things that have been asked for that are well within the scope of this 
kind of technology is clicking on a river to get its flow and its width, or getting a building’s 
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composition or many other significant intelligence –related advances.  All of that can be 
added. 
In summary, as an example of advanced adaptive decision support, SEAWAY is “different 
strokes for different folks”.  Adaptive decision support systems should be useful tools.  For 
the acquisition community, Seaway is being used to model future ship capabilities. The 
Marine Corps is looking at it from the standpoint of how to support operational maneuver 
from a sea base, and what kinds of formations are supportable under what kinds of 
condition, doing what sort of combat. The operational planning teams have used it on the 
West Coast to generate schemes of maneuver and to quickly assess their supportability. 
The combat developers at are exploring the new concepts by building schemes of 
maneuver under different kinds of weather and different kinds of terrain to see what they 
result in, and introducing new equipment, new trucks.  Or, for example, a 22% reduction in 
fuel consumption – what does that do to free helicopters from logistics delivery missions 
for assault support?  The impact could be enormous; a less consumptive force could have a 
significant impact on the helicopter requirements to support it. SEAWAY can help us get 
these answers and many, many more. 
I thank you for your attention. Thank you very much. 
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